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Did Weimar Fail?* 
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What is Weimar without the Republic? Not much, it seems, since for most German 
historians the plot that holds the story together has been fragile democracy and its 
demise. "Weimar" is, as numerous subtitles inform us, the "history of the first Ger- 
man Democracy," the site where democracy surrendered or failed.' The drama of 
twentieth-century Germany has largely turned on the failure of the Weimar Repub- 
lic. All the grand scholarly investments in the study of big-business relations, small- 
town clubs, East Elbian provinces, and a staggering variety of interest groups and 
political parties have been undertaken to explain more successfully the frailties of 
the Republic. This focus has been meritorious since it has guided political self- 
understandings in postwar Germany and indicated possible limits to the legitimacy 
of modem democracies generally. Even the notable political guru Kevin Phillips has 
invoked Weimar to warn his Republican clients not to forget "Middle Ameri~a."~ 
But preoccupation with the fate of the Republic has been so single-minded that it 
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has tended to assign Germany the part of the twentieth-century delinquent whose 
role is to certify the basic political virtue of France, Britain, and the United States, 
in what might be dubbed "NATO hi~tory."~ This assignment not only misconstrues 
political developments in the West but also reduces politics in the Weimar era to the 
question of support for or opposition to parliamentary liberalism, thereby turning 
the 1920s into a political universe that revolves around the Reichstag on the Platz 
der Republik. 
Did the Republic really mean that much to Germans after World War I? There is 
considerable evidence that it did not. In the first place, politicians and voters repeat- 
edly averred that the crucial questions facing Germany did not turn on a formal 
choice between republicanism or monarchism but rather on the quality of social 
relations that made up the nation. A look at the political discourse of the 1920s, when 
contenders peddled concepts such as "economic democracy" (Wirtschafsdemokra-
tie), "national community" (Volksgemeinschaf), or a more conservative "corporate 
state" (Standestaat),suggests that neither liberalism nor illiberalism provides a help- 
ful benchmark. An intense reexamination of social groups, cultural representations, 
and political institutions in the last fifteen years has fundamentally challenged the 
extent to which historical change may be usefully judged against normative concep- 
tions of liberalism." A great deal of the political dynamic in the 1920s is obscured 
by the telos of Weimar's collapse. At the grassroots level, Weimar's favorite sons 
and daughters-working-class socialists-now appear more attracted to nationalist 
sentiments and mass-cultural diversions, while history's muggers-middle-class in-
surgents-appear far less pathological and much more social reformist. Moreover, 
growing numbers of historians acknowledge the broad popularity of the Nazis, who 
are no longer simply understood as creatures of crisis and dislocation. At the same 
time, the left-liberal reformers who constructed Europe's most elaborate social- 
welfare state in the years after 19 18 were by no means consistently guided by repub- 
lican ideals. In fact, they shared common assumptions about collective responsibility 
and national health with their right-wing challengers, who, for all the noxiousness 
of their beliefs, were not nearly as backward-looking as scholars once as~umed.~ 
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It is not surprising that the red thread of progress is easy to lose when matters 
are described as being "not nearly" so clear-cut, so reactionary, so liberal. Indeed, 
the provocative consequence of recent Weimar histories has been to disconnect 
modernism from liberalism and to rethink what really is modem or antimodern. 
Radical nationalists, right-wing aesthetes, illiberal jurists, and even National So- 
cialists now jostle with Social Democrats, Bauhaus architects, and Communist in- 
tellectuals as hyphenated modernists. In turn, classical terms like political reaction- 
ary and social progressive have increasingly lost their resonance; historical actions 
appear more indeterminate and open-ended. And once the protagonists and re- 
tardants of progress can no longer be identified with certainty, it becomes more 
difficult to see the Weimar Republic as a failure or to deny the Third Reich status 
as a legitimate, if extreme, outcome of twentieth-century civilization. Just how 
much the narrative of the Weimar years has strayed from the well-marked path of 
creation, crisis, and collapse is evident in the newly cherished vocabulary that 
draws attention to the proliferation of "political blueprints," "cultural experiments:' 
and "social initiatives" on the Left and the Right and summarizes Weimar as the 
laboratory of "classical m~dernity."~ Mostly minted by Detlev Peukert in the mid- 
1980s, and widely circulated since, this language calls into question the whole 
notion of failure. If Weimar is conceived in terms of experiments designed to man- 
age (however deleteriously) the modem condition, then the failure of political de- 
mocracy is not the same as the destruction of the laboratory. Indeed, the Third 
Reich can be regarded as one possible Weimar production. Perhaps the long- 
awaited "new paradigm" for German history has arrived in the form of the dis- 
avowal of the master narrative of the Republic in the name of the eclectic experi- 
mentalism of Weimar. 
Scholarly revaluations of aesthetics and power have prepared the new frame- 
work for interpreting the Weimar years. On the one hand, the political aspirations 
of social groups are no longer regarded in simple terms of class.' The "linguistic 
turn" has indicated the extent to which subjects think about the political world in 
ways that are not accurate reflections of social reality. These representations bear 
the traces of past traditions, linguistic conventions, and cultural media, and they 
became constituent parts of that real it^.^ Moreover, individuals entered the public 
sphere in a variety of social identities. Metalworkers, to take one example dis-
cussed at length by Alf Liidtke, were not simply trade unionists and (often) Social 
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Crisis of Classical Modernity, trans. Richard Deveson (New York, 1989). 
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Democrats, but also husbands and fathers, veterans and Germans, gymnasts and 
gardeners. As such, they responded to any number of compelling visions about the 
legitimate order of society, the proper roles for men and women, and the future of 
the nation. Emotional affinities to the nation, in particular, mobilized considerable 
political sentiment. It is now clear that substantial numbers of workers, including 
longtime Social Democrats, voted for the Nazis in 1930 and 1932, and those who 
did not still responded positively to nationalist appeals in the years that followed 
and accommodated themselves more or less easily to the National Socialist regime. 
The reach of various nationalist mobilizations was far greater than classic social 
interpretations of the Weimar Republic have suggested. In the hands of "new cul- 
tural" historians, postwar politics is as much the product of desire and imagination 
as of function and interest. Intricate webs of contingency now obscure from view 
the previously conspicuous Sondenveg, the peculiarly German path of illiberal 
modernization that oriented most historians in the 1960s and 1 9 7 0 ~ . ~  
The imagination of the nation is central as well to the "new political" history 
that has eschewed strictly party-political questions about the rise of National So- 
cialism or the collapse of liberalism or the fate of Social Democracy and expanded 
the very concept of political power. Innovative studies of social welfare, education, 
and health during the Weimar period have focused on the ways in which individual 
bodies were worked on in the name of the national body, or Volkskorper While the 
emancipatory potential of social legislation is not overlooked, the central theme of 
this scholarship (and many more studies are in press) is the regimentation and 
discipline of citizens in often dangerously imaginative ways. A Foucauldian per- 
spective on the links between individual and national bodies not only establishes 
significant continuities between the Weimar era and the Third Reich but also indi- 
cates how malleable postwar social life had become. Rather than a model battle- 
ground between modem liberals and antimodern authoritarians, Weimar is the fas- 
cinating foreground against which to track the dark shadows of modernity. 
The Weimar that emerges from recent historiography is strikingly open-ended. 
This is not to suggest that democracy as such could have survived. Gerald Feldman 
is probably right to argue that the Republic was, from the beginning, a "gamble 
which stood virtually no chance of su~cess."'~ But much more than parliamentary 
democracy was at stake. An astonishing variety of dreamers and adventurers pros- 
pered in the postwar years. The fact that Weimar came without operating instruc- 
The classic statements of the Sonderweg are Ralf Dahrendorf, Sociely and Democracy in Ger- 
many (Garden City, N.Y., 1967); and Hans-Ulrich Wehler, The German Empire, 1871-1918, trans. 
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"The Kaiserreich Recast? Continuity and Change in Modem Geman Historiography," Journal of 
Social History 17 (1984): 442-50; James N. Retallack, "Social History with a Vengeance? Some 
Reactions to H.-U.Wehler's 'Das Deutsche Kaisemeich,"' German Studies Review 7 (1984): 
655-83; and Jiirgen Kocka, "Geman History before Hitler: The Debate about the German 
Sonderweg," Journal of Contemporary History 23 (1988): 3-16. See also Helga Grebing, Der 
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tions (Gebrauchsanweisungen),as Alfred Doblin once put it, encouraged experi- 
mentation as much as it hobbled democracy. At the end of World War I, previously 
authoritative instructions about law, legitimacy, and community no longer seemed 
applicable; new blueprints and experiments filled in the empty space and gave the 
German future of the 1920s its uncertain and promiscuous aspect. The common 
note to the political and cultural history of the period is the widespread conviction 
that the material world could be designed: Bertolt Brecht believed that it would 
become possible for people to be taken apart and put back together like machines, 
Carl Schmitt cited Georges Sore1 to redeem politics with myth, Bauhaus architects 
plotted out "regulating lines" that would refurbish social life, radical nationalists 
envisioned fantastic technologies to circumvent Versailles, geographers redrew 
schoolbook maps to reveal Germany's essential capacities, and social workers ener- 
getically renovated national health. Given this industrious invention of the future, 
1933 is not simply a tragic and dramatic foreclosure but an indication as well of 
the fullness and the contingency of historical development. As is evident from the 
books under review here, historians continue to watch Weimar closely, and they do 
so not least because it is a place where modem history appears remarkably contin- 
gent. The Weimar Republic remains compelling not because of the glimpses of 
social democracy and social welfare it offers but because its public life was formed 
so forcefully by the sense that nothing was certain and everything possible. 
Given the fact that the Weimar period witnessed revolutionary and counterrevolu- 
tionary assaults in Hamburg, Berlin, and Munich, a black-flagged farmers' insur- 
rection in the northem provinces, the formation of "antisystem" parties and para- 
military groups in almost every town and village, the largest Communist party in 
the West, and clumsy but nonetheless determined efforts at reinvigorating state 
authority by Chancellors Briining, Papen, and Schleicher before Adolf Hitler and 
the National Socialists rapidly established one-party dictatorship, political initia- 
tive was anything but restricted. Yet rifts, obstacles, and other immovable land- 
marks characterize the political topography described in the major syntheses by 
two prominent historians, Heinrich August Winkler and Hans Mommsen. What 
was blocked, of course, were republican possibilities, not political initiatives. It is 
this misleading correspondence between the fate of the Republic and the drama of 
Weimar that keeps these two major histories restricted mainly to parliamentary 
politics in Berlin and rather uncertain about how to treat the dramatic movement 
of so many Germans away from the established parties. 
The central theme in Winkler's "history of the first German democracy" is a 
tragic but redemptive one: the cooperation between labor and industry and between 
Social Democrats and modem conservatives that eluded Weimar's hardworking 
politicians and is now the proud achievement of those in Bonn. Recognition of the 
necessity for compromise is, for Winkler, the mark of democrats, and in his view 
Weimar had many more of them than we might at first imagine-a discovery Win- 
kler wants to reinvest in the prospect of newly reunified Germany. Social Demo- 
crats gamer praise for turning against the annexationist war, resisting the undemo- 
634 Fritzsche 
cratic council movement, joining with bourgeois coalition partners in difficult 
circumstances and, despite social and economic sacrifices, keeping desertions to 
the Communist Left modest. Less consistent, but praiseworthy nonetheless, is the 
moderate Right. Winkler emphasizes the scope of the social peace that ensued 
during the "inflation consensus" of 1919-21 and the "rationalization consensus" 
of 1924-30. 
Economic stabilization after 1924 provides Winkler the opportunity to step back 
from political narrative. But the highly informative chapter on the deep divisions 
in German society after Hindenburg's election in April 1925 does not keep him 
from giving the Republic a real chance for survival. He is rightly impressed by the 
unemployment insurance that a bourgeois coalition legislated in 1927. Moreover, 
Winkler's dramatization of the Great Depression as a singular disaster highlights 
the achievement of stability that it concluded. It was economic catastrophe, more 
than anything else, that gave the "antisystem" forces that had quietly furthered their 
aims in high places the chance they would otherwise not have gotten. In 1929 and 
1930, more and more industrialists came to share the ideological predispositions 
of right-wing nationalists, Reichswehr officers, and Hindenburg cronies, viewing 
democracy (particularly once the Young Plan had been safely signed) as an eco- 
nomic liability. The result was the breakdown of a center-left coalition and the 
chancellorship of Heinrich Briining in March 1930, a break with parliamentary 
democracy that Winkler follows Arthur Rosenberg in emphasizing.I1 Although the 
numbers of Vernunftrepublikaner(republicans of the head rather than of the heart) 
had dwindled by 1929 almost to a single man-Gustav Stresemann, who is accord- 
ingly well honored here-Winkler does not see the makings of broad antisystem 
insurgency before 1930. He notes but does not make much of the rise of splinter 
parties, the activity of the Stahlhelm, and the rumblings of Landvolk protest. As a 
result, there is little sense of the radical nationalism that Geoff Eley, Rudy Koshar, 
and others have regarded as a central dynamic in twentieth-century German pol- 
itics.I2 
For Winkler it is the Great Depression that destroyed the close-to-even odds that 
economic stabilization had offered the first German Republic. Without this disas- 
ter, Winkler implies, democracy might have stumbled along and even won converts. 
Indeed, as Winkler points out in a highly original line of argument, the proof that 
basic lessons of democracy had been learned by ordinary Germans is the very 
success of the National Socialists who, after 1930, positioned themselves as repre- 
sentatives of the people against authoritarian schemers. In 1932, as in 1918, most 
Germans demanded popular representation. Unfortunately, this promising insight 
is not complemented by a more detailed investigation of middle-class voters, who 
remain indistinct. As for the Social Democrats, they were caught up in a game they 
Arthur Rosenberg, A History of the German Republic (New York, 1965). 
l 2  Geoff Eley, "Conservatives and Radical Nationalists in Germany: The Production of Fascist 
Potentials, 1912-1928:' in Fascists and Conservatives in Europe, ed. Martin Blinkhorn (London, 
1990), pp. 50-70; Rudy Koshar, Social Life, Local Politics and Nazism: Marburg, 1880-1935 
(Chapel Hill, N.C., 1986); and Peter Fritzsche, Rehearsals for Fascism: Populism and Political 
Mobilization in Weimar Germany (New York, 1990). 
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could not win: honorably supporting constitutional legalism, but doing so in a way 
that kept them from giving voice to popular indignation at increasingly ineffective 
presidia1 regimes. In these final chapters, then, the Nazis emerge as populists, rail- 
ing against unrepresentative, distant rulers and generating a sense of collective 
unity. Winkler ends his elegantly written book with allusions to grassroots expecta- 
tions and collective persuasions that are neglected in the body of this largely politi- 
cal history. 
That Weimar was burdened by the archaic political traditions and intense social 
conflicts of the Wilhelmine period forms the foundation of Mominsen's history of 
Weimar as much as it does Winkler's. But Mommsen sees little of the democratic 
development that Winkler cherishes. Right off, the reader is infonned of the "ex- 
treme autism" of the German public (p. 9). Indeed; Mommsen is more generous to 
politicians in the capital than to constituents in the provinces. He has little patience 
with the million-headed public that allows itself to be mobilized first by imperial 
nationalists before 1914, then by the Vatel-larzdspartei, in 1918 the largest mass 
organization in Germany, and finally in the 1920s by polemical antiparliamentari- 
ans and volkisch demagogues. In other words, democracy was threatened from the 
outset by broad-based chauvinist sentiments that the collective traumas of military 
defeat, revolution, and inflation only hardened. This is the Germany that cheered 
Ludendorff, applauded the Freikorps, voted for Hitler, and opposed the other, 
mostly working-class Germany. which stood for social justice and democracy yet 
grew alienated from the Republic. The confrontation of these two nations left little 
room for effective statecraft. and Ebert and Stresemann accordingly play much 
more subdued roles in Mommsen's narrative. Instead, the emphasis falls on by- 
now familiar middle-class anxieties, collective traumas, and humiliations of status- 
conscious elites, all of which were easily mobilized by extremists such as Hitler 
who made the resentments of the public their own. 
The result is a dramatic history in which readers find epic engagements between 
ideological enemies who play out Wilhelmine scripts with more exaggerated Wei- 
marian gestures. The title-"Squandered Freedomn-notwithstanding, there is Iit- 
tle in this book about workable social coalitions, republican margins of safety, or 
stabilization-era consensus. Virtue is reserved for social groups. notably, the orga- 
nized working class, rather than the political practitioners whom Winkler com- 
mends. Although Mommsen recognizes the break of 1929130, it takes the form of 
a culmination of frustrations rather than the singular catastrophe of depression. 
There is something satisfying about the active tense of this deeply felt history. 
Strong-armed verbs and colorful adjectives bring to life the paramilitary groups 
and volkisch speechmakers who appear only sporadically in Winkler's narrative. 
Cultural politics are taken seriously in the form of fantasies, traumas, and Feind-
bilder: And yet Mommsen risks caricaturing Hitler's Germany. It comes too ready- 
made from the Wilhelmine past. Collective inheritance overwhelms collective 
identity, and readers get little sense of political transformations or social exchanges 
over time. Most middle-class Germans appear dead-set against the Republic. com- 
pletely at odds with the cultural experimentation of the metropolis, and utterly 
incapable of reacting except defensively or resentfully-though at least workers 
get to be alienated. Thus, the National Socialists stand in line, hand-in-hand. with 
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all sorts of reprehensible nationalist groups from the Wilhelmine period. Momm- 
sen is quite clear: the Nazis' success was not a simple function of economic catas- 
trophe. But with no positive ideological appeal, they made no claim on Germany's 
intellectual heritage. Weimar becomes the final measure of political opportunism 
and moral indifference. 
Political autism also provides the concluding note to Richard Bessel's recent 
study of demobilization, Germany after the First World Wal: This comprehensive 
examination of German's troubled transition from war to peace is a grandly impres- 
sive piece of social history that ends with curiously idealistic conclusions in the 
realm of political civics. Marshaling ten years of archival research, Bessel exarn- 
ines the widespread desire for a return to normalcy, notes the thoroughly inade- 
quate preparations for demobilization, and explores in detail the improvised effort 
that eventually took place in autumn 1918. The unexpectedly abrupt demobiliza- 
tion in November and December 1918 had three important consequences: it got 
six million soldiers home without too much trouble, put the postwar transition 
largely in the hands of industry and organized labor, and pushed the government 
to subsidize industrial production and welfare expenditures on a massive scale in 
an attempt to ward off social disorder by means of full employment. That wartime 
inflation gave way to postwar inflation expressed the classic Weimar dilemma: 
the economic policies of demobilization were "both temporarily successful and 
politically necessary," but they "put off the evil day when the economic and politi- 
cal bill for the war would have to be paid" (p. 124). Likewise, "measures which 
were probably economically necessary for the long-term health of the country were 
politically impossible in the short term" (p. 123). Thus, the main chapters of Bes- 
sel's story, in which he surveys labor, agricultural, and housing conditions, delin- 
eate a surprisingly orderly return to economic normalcy. Large-scale disruptions 
were avoided, and government controls on the economy gradually lifted. Although 
the social peace that inflation purchased provided the Republic a margin of survival 
in the first years after the Revolution,13 it also supported the illusion that there could 
be a return to 1913. 
If the extreme dislocation of the war embellished the fantasy of a largely patriar- 
chal world of security, the relatively modest dislocations of demobilization en- 
hanced its plausibility, burdening, in the long run, the Weimar Republic with ex- 
pectations that could not possibly be met. For Bessel, it was precisely the ease of 
demobilization that kept Germans from coming to terms with the costs of the war 
and thus led them to adopt an agenda increasingly centered on moral issues to 
account for their political impotence. As a result, political practice in the Weimar 
era was clouded by myths that cherished the security of prewar life and castigated 
republican conspirators who withheld it. These recast the horrors veterans experi- 
enced in the trenches into heroics, the welcome they in fact received into shameful 
mistreatment, and the relative ease with which they reintegrated themselves in the 
postwar economy into bewildering chaos. 
In the end, Bessel sounds a rather familiar theme: dreamy political myth de- 
" See also Winkler, p. 144;Gerald D. Feldman, The Great Disorder: Politics, Economics, and 
Society in the German Inflation, 1914-1924 (New York, 1993), pp. 249-50. 
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stroyed responsible political discourse. Bessel repeatedly indicates the extent to 
which Germans did not care to take a "sober look" at accomplishments attained 
and difficulties ahead. Instead of engaging in "open political discussion," "millions 
of Germans retreated into irresponsible political demagogy, into the antidemocratic 
politics of propaganda and illusion" (pp. 282-83). Bessel's assumption here is that 
politics usually is and certainly ought to be about "real social needs and economic 
priorities" (p. 282). While the link between sober politics and republican survival 
may be credible, it is not at all clear that politics is usually conducted soberly or 
that myths and fictions are not regular constituents of worldviews. In the end, the 
sharp, normative distinction between responsibility and demagogy confuses analy- 
sis of popular motivations. A closer look suggests that "demagogic politics" may 
be antidemocratic, and surely sidesteps painful choices-but it is effective. Even 
as Bessel acknowledges the force of myth and fantasy, he avoids concluding that 
Weimar demonstrates precisely the degree to which political mobilization is rooted 
in the imagination. To dismiss this as "playing to the gallery" is to take a very 
limited view of politics.14 
A more nuanced if less ambitious discussion of nostalgic myths and antirepubli- 
can politics is Shelley Baranowski's The Sanctity of Rural Life: Nobility, Protes- 
tantism, and Nazism in Weimar Prussia. Baranowski's elegant, almost elegiac his- 
tory shows how the rise of Nazism in Pomerania was rooted in pastoral myth, a 
finding that challenges the repeated emphasis in the last years on the radical nature 
of fascism. At the center of her analysis is the "myth of the "sanctity of rural life" 
that ultimately bound estate owners and agricultural laborers. The result is a fine 
illustration of how culture shapes politics in ways that are not rational or sober. 
Baranowski is mindful of rural class conflicts, but she argues that economic hard- 
ship in the 1920s reinforced social conventions of deference, which remained 
widespread in the nonmonetary economy of the estate village. What made villages 
of social harmony into seedbeds of political militance were the unsettling market 
relations, big-city morals, and harsh secularism of the Weimar Republic. Once the 
Nazis made their peace with local elites, they quickly emerged as the best guaran- 
tors of rural life. 
Baranowski is surely right to remind historians of the degree to which Nazis 
were tied to local conventions and local hierarchies. Hitler's brownshirts were not 
adventurous outsiders, as the Freikorpsmen had been, and their populism was not 
socialism. Nonetheless, the differences between the Nazis and the conservative 
German Nationalists whom they displaced so dramatically add up to more than 
"family quarrels" (p. 163). The problem is not to explain why estate owners sup- 
ported the Nazis (with varying degrees of enthusiasm), but why they did not seem 
to have any other choice. Why did all the "family quarrels" of the early 1930s end 
so resoundingly in National Socialist victories? This family seems more extended, 
recombined, and troubled, and, by extension, the Nazis seem more intrusive than 
Baranowski allows. Unfortunately, a more comprehensive understanding of the 
l4 Richard Bessel, "Why Did the Weimar Republic Collapse?' in Kershaw, ed. (n. 1 above), p. 
122. See also Richard Bessel, "Die Krise der Weimarer Republik als Erblast des verlorenen 
Krieges," in Bajohr et al., eds., pp. 98-114. 
Nazis is undermined by the difficulty Baranowski has-despite her best efforts- 
in giving a voice to agricultural laborers and peasant villagers, and thus to the 
majority of Pomerania's Nazi voters. Extensive research in local, regional, and 
church archives does not remove the focus of this fascinating study in rural political 
culture from colorful but small numbers of estate owners such as the von Krockows 
with whom this book opens and closes. 
A useful corrective is Jonathan Osmond's investigation of peasant protest in the 
Rhineland and Bavaria in the early 1920s. Whereas Baranowski examines estates 
and estate villages, Osmond looks at independent peasants. Examining grassroots 
politics, Osmond very plausibly argues in favor of an increasingly radical mobiliza- 
tion that took place during the war and early postwar years. Peasants learned demo- 
cratic forms and emerged as self-assertive political contenders. Whether monar- 
chist, nationalist, or volkisch, groups like the Free Peasantry studied here made a 
virtue of mobilization and quickly overshadowed the more deferential Peasants' 
Associations and Agrarian Leagues. The increasingly dense organization and 
prickly self-reliance of peasants is persuasive and indicates that the persistence of 
prewar social hierarchy that Baranowski sees in Pomerania does not hold for small 
farmers in the West. Insubordinate populism thus remains a crucial part of the 
transformation of Weimar politics. Unfortunately, Osmond does not completely 
succeed in animating his peasants or their politics. This is a slight book that looks 
at organized groups but not at villages and is based largely on a reading of govern- 
ment reports. Although Osmond's analysis reaches an interesting climax when he 
examines the separatist actions of the Free Peasantry in 1923, the drama is quite 
secondary to the disorder wrought by the Landvolk-the rural people's movement 
in northern Germany-some years later. Given the Landvolk's expressive localism 
and explosive politics, it is surprising that the movement has been completely ig- 
nored by recent work on German rural life.15 A much needed investigation of the 
Landvolk would reveal much more clearly than has been done previously how self- 
reliance and political radicalism went hand-in-hand and challenged both liberal 
republicans and conservative nationalists. 
Nonetheless, the virtue of local studies such as Baranowski's and Osmond's is 
that the governing frame of the fate of the Republic is much less evident. They 
illuminate the full complexity of Weimar era constituents. When peasants in Plot- 
zig or Pirmasens opposed Berlin democrats, they did so on the basis of robust 
activism and sturdy cultural associations that can hardly be described as autistic. In 
other words, the elaboration of public life in which constituents sought to construct 
collective meanings and pursue collective interests did not lead to a stronger de- 
mocracy-pace the classic sociological tradition of Tocqueville, Weber, and Durk- 
heim. As long as the fate of the Republic remains the emotional center of Weimar 
l5 The Landvolk appears on the horizon of Baranowski's study but, astonishingly enough, is not 
treated in Robert Moeller, ed., Peasants and Lords in Modem Germany: Recent Studies in Agricul- 
tural History (Boston, 1986). Conan Fischer, The German Communists and the Rise of Nazism 
(New York, 1991), examines political affinities between the Communists and the Nazis but ignores 
entirely the Landvolk, which both groups celebrated and courted. The best study of the Landvolk 
is Michelle Le Bars, Le rnouvernent paysan dans le Schleswig-Holstein, 1928-1932 (Bern, 1986). 
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history, the widespread political mobilization of working- and middle-class Ger- 
mans and the political dynamic that culminated in the Nazi victories of 1930 and 
1932 will remain misunderstood. At issue in the 1920s was not simply the recovery 
of social stability or economic prosperity but questions of cultural value, political 
entitlement, and nationalist sentiment that are not easily parsed in terms of support 
for or opposition to parliamentary democracy. Weimar voters were much more 
ideological, unpredictable, and, indeed, interesting figures than the anguished wan- 
derers among the postwar ruins to which we continue to be introduced in even the 
best syntheses. 
Of course, it would be foolish to diminish estimates of the disruption caused by 
the war. Richard Bessel effectively tabulates the costs of a war in which more 
than thirteen million men-fully one-fifth of the total population-served in the 
German army and, in most cases, actually fought at the front. At home, long work- 
ing hours, poor hygiene, and unnourishing meals created horrible suffering. More- 
over, wartime inflation served as a daily reminder that "the fixed relationships of 
the prewar world had been destroyed." l h  There was good cause for Germans to look 
back nostalgically on the years before the war. Nonetheless, postwar politics cannot 
be reduced to the recovery of social order. 
World War I generated a web of institutional practices and ideological ties that 
connected citizens to the nation in novel ways. Even as historians have overdrawn 
the popular resonance of patriotic community in August 1914," it is clear that 
Germans developed new emotional affinities to the nation, found a mostly deferen- 
tial monarchism wanting, and experimented with new, more democratic political 
practices. The war provided the opportunity to reimagine national forms, and it 
wrecked more than refurbished the legitimacy of the prewar world. Indeed. Bessel 
acknowledges and Winkler emphasizes that most Germans had lost faith in the 
monarchy and the military by 1918. Much of the subsequent electoral volatility of 
middle-class voters, who distrusted social reactionaries as much as social revolu- 
tionaries. was the result of wartime experiences that enfranchised as well as con- 
scripted citizens in a multitude of meaningful ways. At the same time, workers 
mobilized to protect their interests but also supported the national struggle. While 
the November 1918 revolution cannot be understood without reference to growing 
radicalism on the shop floor and at the market square, the years that followed can- 
not be understood without acknowledging how wartime experiences upholstered 
nationalist identities. Reflected in images of disciplined soldiers, skilled workers, 
patriotic sisters, complex machines, and self-made heroes such as the ace Os- 
wald Boelcke, Chief of Staff Erich Ludendoi-ff, and even the people's favorite. the 
Supreme Commander, Paul von Hindenburg, Germany at war increasingly recast 
itself in plebian terms. Unfortunately. working-class nationalism has been virtually 
ignored by historians, who focus instead on the quality of social-welfare arrange- 
ments that originated during the war and were expanded in the 1920s, inquire 
whether the political victory of the Social Democrats in November 1918 proved 
'Wes~el,Genr~any after the Firsl World Wu;al; p. 3 1. 
"Wolfgang Kruse. Krie(: rind notio?~nle Itttegration: Eine Ne14inte,~?refutim des so:iulr(rntu-
kmti.rchen Bi~r~i~ieder~s.sc/zl~~~rses,19I4/15 (Essen. 1994). 
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too economically burdensome in the long run, and emphasize the degree to which 
the legitimacy of the Republic rested on social legislation.18 The result is that the 
story of workers in the 1920s is driven by the fortunes of the Republic. However, 
a series of new studies questions conventional assumptions that see workers as 
allied to the Republic and largely immune to nationalist sentiments. Now that it is 
evident that even socialist workers voted for the Nazis in considerable numbers, 
historians will have to reconsider "social interpretations" of the Weimar period and 
pay more attention to the nationalist imagination. 
A discussion of nationalist sentiment is best begun with a presentation of empirical 
evidence. In a readable, tightly argued exposition of his detailed statistical analyses 
on Weimar elections, Jiirgen Falter has indisputably demonstrated that in Septem- 
ber 1930, 13 percent of all workers voted for the Nazis; by July 1932, the number 
had increased to 27 percent. At these same times, workers represented 27 percent 
and 28 percent of the respective Nazi electorates. These are very high figures cut- 
ting against the grain of long-held assumptions. Even if rural workers are factored 
out, the Nazis made considerable gains among industrial and urban workers and 
were, in fact, Germany's largest proletarian party for most of the year 1932 (pp. 
220,224,225,229). One of every six Social Democratic voters in the 1930 election 
abandoned the party for the Nazis two years later, so that even political tradition 
did not immunize workers. One of every ten Nazi voters in the summer of 1932 
was an ex-Social Democrat (p. 11 1). Clearly, the Nazi message resonated among 
left-wing workers, and historians have to figure out why. Falter also confirms ear- 
lier findings by Thomas Childers: white-collar employees were surprisingly disin- 
clined to vote for the Nazis, while Protestant civil servants, retailers, artisans, and 
farmers were much more predisposed to do so. "The National Socialists," Falter 
concludes, "recruited their electorate from so many social groups that the NSDAP 
is best described with Childers as a party of collective protest" (p. 289). 
Falter goes on to evaluate his data against three explanatory models: the class- 
based analysis of Seymour Martin Lipset, who underlined the lower-middle-class 
nature of the Nazi electorate and presumed the immunity of industrial workers to 
National Socialism; the mass-society hypothesis of Reinhard Bendix, who located 
Nazi gains among previously unmobilized groups such as first-time voters and 
previous nonvoters; and Walter Dean Burnham's argument about the role of politi- 
cal confession in regulating electoral behavior. Weighing the pros and cons of each, 
Falter finds that the evidence fits Burnham's model most completely. Even if Burn- 
ham underestimated the susceptibility of Catholic and Social Democratic voters to 
the Nazis, he underscored the degree to which the Protestant bourgeois parties 
l 8  David Abraham, The Collapse of the Weimar Republic: Political Economy and Crisis, 2d 
rev. ed. (New York, 1986); Peukert, The Weimar Republic (n. 6 above), pp. 129, 253-54; Knut 
Borchardt, "Constraints and Room for Manoeuvre in the Great Depression of the Early Thirties: 
Towards a Revision of the Received Historical Picture," in his Perspectives on Modern German 
Economic Histov and Policy, trans. Peter Lambert (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 143-60. 
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were unable to hold onto theirs. For this reason, Burnham calls Germany's Protes- 
tant burghers "unchurched." But if the bourgeois bloc is expanded to include the 
Nazis, it suddenly displays considerable coherence, with only very few voters leav- 
ing the fold over time.I9 This is confirmed by the remarkable finding that the best 
predictor of the results of Hitler's 1932 presidential campaign against Hindenburg 
was, in fact, Hindenburg's showing against Wilhelm Marx in 1925. For Falter, 
these two elections are among "the most fascinating and historically significant" 
in German history (p. 123), indicating the degree to which support for Hitler was 
prefigured in bourgeois coalitions well before the Depression and was confined 
mostly to a politically coherent if socially heterogeneous "burgher bloc." Falter is 
quick to point out that Social Democratic and even Catholic votes were important 
to Nazi totals, particularly in 1932. Nonetheless, the main outline of the Nazi elec- 
torate becomes clear if the political rather than social origins of voters are empha- 
sized. This is reason enough to question the current assumption that the Nazis were 
simply "a catch-all party of protest."z0 Falter's correlations indicate that Nazism 
rested on a broad nationalist insurgency. 
The sweep of Nazi gains among even Social Democratic workers challenges 
the value of a class-based interpretation of German fascism. Conventional social 
categories such as worker, shopkeeper, or employee, and the political markers of 
Left and Right or socialist and bourgeois they encompass, simply did not make 
sense of the dynamic of German politics after World War I. To understand the 
primacy of politics that seems manifest here, historians have little choice but to 
venture out onto the flimsy superstructure of collective identities, cultural prac- 
tices, and nationalist sentiments. 
It is useful to examine what the National Socialists offered voters that the Social 
Democrats did not, particularly since the Nazis emerged as Germany's largest party 
in 1932, exactly twenty years after the socialists had. Both parties were the main 
contenders for the hearts and minds of German voters in the early 1930s. The Nazis 
not only won over large numbers of Social Democrats but, in addition, as Falter 
shows, the Social Democrats had already benefited from former Nazi voters in 
1928 and 1930 (one in six 1928 socialist voters had voted Nazi in December 1924 
[p. 11 11). Indeed, there are striking similarities between the Social Democratic 
Party (SPD) and the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP): each 
party acknowledged the power of the other, and the Social Democrats provided the 
National Socialists with the basic model of political organization. Moreover, both 
parties left considerable numbers of voters disappointed. The Nazi party not only 
suffered a revolving-door membership but also, in November 1932, lost two mil- 
l9 Falter, pp. 114-17. See also Seymour Martin Lipset, "Fascism-Left, Right, and Center," in 
his Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (Garden City, N.J., 1960). pp. 127-79; Reinhard 
Bendix, "Social Stratification and Social Power," American Political Science Review 46 (1952): 
357-75; and Walter Dean Burnham, "Political Immunization and Political Confessionalism: The 
United States and Weimar Germany," Jourtzal of lnterdisciplitzary History 3 (1972): 1-30. See also 
the excellent essay by Bernt Hagtvet, "The Theory of Mass Society and the Collapse of the Weimar 
Republic: A Reexamination," in Larsen et al., eds. (n. 2 above), pp. 66-117. 
20 Thomas Childers, The Nazi Voter: The Social Foundations of Fascism in Germany, 191 9-1 933 
(Chapel Hill, N.C., 1983), pp. 264-65. 
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lion voters. At the same time, Social Democrats had difficulty breaking out of their 
traditional working-class milieu and failed to respond to the growing number of 
Germans disillusioned with parliamentary politics. Although Donna Harsch does 
not explicitly say so, her first-class analysis of the engagement between these two 
political machines, Geman Social Democracy and the Rise of Nazism, indicates 
that both parties mobilized unfulfilled reformist expectations. (According to Fal- 
ter's correlations [p. 1111, the much-reported political exchange between the so- 
called extremes, the Nazis and the Communists, did not take place.) The Nazis 
were more successful than the Social Democrats because they effectively repre- 
sented a national identity that was appealing precisely because it promised to break 
with older collective, associations identified with the politics of failure. In a strange 
twist that Harsch might have discussed at greater length, nationalism came to de- 
note a radicalism deemed necessary to achieve a thorough renovation of cata- 
strophic social and economic condition^.^' 
The trouble with the Social Democrats, Harsch argues, is that they did not effec- 
tively embrace their radical democratic nature. Although the party's electorate 
looked forward to an ambitious political agenda that would address Germany's 
pressing problems, Social Democratic leaders dithered. Harsch is perfectly aware 
of the difficult political and economic climate in the early 1930s. And the move- 
ment itself was constituted by heterogeneous elements: party, trade union, and the 
Reichsbanner. Nonetheless, "Prussian reformers" and orthodox Marxists in the 
party leadership kept the Social Democrats from delivering a more attractive and 
more radical (but non-Marxist) message to the German electorate in the depths of 
the Depression. 
Harsch is not always clear about what a "republican-parliamentary period of 
reform" (p. 45) or a "bold program of democratization" (p. 62) might have looked 
like, but she is certainly making the right inquiries. She calls on a minority of 
radicals such as Julius Leber, Theo Haubach, and Carlo Mierendorff to testify to 
the party's inability to develop a coherent social program or a critique of "real 
existing" parliamentarianism. While the public "craved action" (p. 62) to overcome 
unemployment, the SPD fought to protect unemployment benefits or else declined 
to doctor a sick capitalism altogether. A militant class-against-class rhetoric was 
feeble compensation for reformist practices, with the result that the Social Demo- 
crats neither satisfied loyal supporters nor won new adherents. The party's failure 
to adopt the Woytinsky-Tarnow-Baade public works plan proposed by trade union 
leaders in spring 1932 was indeed what Harsch rightly calls a "momentous blun- 
der" (p. 190). The Nazis adopted it instead. 
Unable to assess the radical disillusionment of voters, the Social Democrats mis- 
read the rise of the Nazis, whom they dismissed as reactionaries and capitalists and 
whose supporters they regarded condescendingly as deluded and irrational. Only 
a few observers acknowledged the popular resonance of the NSDAP's reformism. 
Yet when Social Democrats in Hesse and Hamburg experimented in 1932 with a 
more confident style of agitation, replaced proletarian with national motifs, and 
appealed to the Volk in the name of freedom rather than of the Republic, the results 
21  See also Fischer. 
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were encouraging. These partial successes in the face of broader Social Democratic 
failures indicate just where the Nazis outmaneuvered their foes. What the National 
Socialists offered the public was the simple, constantly reiterated promise that 
present circumstances would be radically altered for the benefit of the entire nation. 
This proved effective against both the traditional Right and the traditional Left. 
The Social Democrats, by contrast, were tied to a discursive, rational language that 
resonated deeply among working-class supporters but withheld an immediate and 
indignant response to the crisis. For all the differences, however, the impression 
remains that many voters judged the National Socialists in terms of longer-term 
disappointments with, rather than outright opposition to, Social Democracy, and 
regarded the two parties not as polar opposites but as more and less able reformers. 
By focusing on the confrontation between Social Democracy and National So- 
cialism. Harsch highlights the conceptual differences between the two movements, 
reexamines the broad appeal of radical reform, and thereby makes a provocative 
and timely contribution to the study of German politics. But where Harsch suggests 
that the Republic was not a terribly important issue for voters and faults the SPD 
for compromising its otherwise appealing democratic radicalism by its attempt to 
steady parliamentary institutions, Wolfram Pyta commends the party for its consis- 
tent and energetic efforts on behalf of the Republic. It is not clear why Pyta under- 
takes this exhaustive study, since the SPD's basically good intentions have not been 
in doubt. But along the way, the author makes some important points. Like Harsch, 
he is struck by the clumsiness of SPD thinkers who generally could not compre- 
hend the charisma of Hitler or the racism of the Nazi message. The Social Demo- 
crats saw what they wanted to see: the anticapitalist sentiment of Nazi voters who 
would eventually come around to the real thing. As a result, Pyta argues, the rise 
of the Nazis confirmed rather than challenged the SPD's proletarian socialism. 
Given this scenario, there was no need for the party to formulate a more populist 
Gemeinschafsgedanke,to repair the economy with public works plans, or to con- 
test at the grass roots the Nazis' ferocious opposition to the conservative Catholic 
chancellor, Heinrich Briining. 
Pyta describes the SPD's official policy of tolerating Briining in 1930-32 as 
a strategy of postponement, during which time the masses would continue their 
anticapitalist journey, moving from the Nazi to the Marxist camp. In the meantime, 
Social Democratic civil servants tried valiantly to dispel the notion that National 
Socialism was inevitable. Unfortunately, efforts at republican enlightenment were 
sporadic and always compromised by uncooperative bourgeois functionaries. This 
is important territory for Pyta to cover, for he is interested in whether Social Demo- 
crats passed the test in defending the Republic. It becomes clear that they did, but 
it is not so clear why this is such a crucial standard for evaluation. Did Social 
Democratic supporters expect such vigilance? Probably not, since the constitu- 
tional legalism the SPD defended so vigorously during the Briining chancellorship 
left the party without a strategy to confront directly the Nazis or to press for radical 
improvements in the lives of ordinary voters. To be sure, Pyta carefully outlines 
the ways in which the SPD's legalism was counterproductive, but he fails to factor 
these into a concluding analysis. Astonishing as well is his assumption that the 
Social Democrats could have made a more energetic pitch to the middle classes, 
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who Pyta sketches in as rather opportunistic, ignoring their basic disposition 
against the left-wing party. By taking the survival of the Republic as the main issue 
and reviewing the policy options of the Social Democrats in that light, Pyta shows 
little feel for Weimar voters themselves. It is unlikely that the Social Democrats 
could have jumped out of their political skins to adopt the brash style of the Nazis, 
reanimate radical workers, win over shopkeepers, and, at the same time, continue 
to defend the constitutional order. 
Radical and national motifs figure prominently in Gerhard Paul's intriguing and 
powerfully argued analysis of the National Socialists' public face. In Aufstand der 
Bilder: Die NS-Propaganda vor 1933 (infelicitously translated as Insurrection of 
Images), Paul does not simply analyze Nazi propaganda, which was aimed at creat- 
ing an emotionally powerful world of illusions designed to (re)conquer workers 
for nationalist ends; he demonstrates the vital role of imagery in politics as well. 
His well-written study is a pathbreaking reconsideration of the very terms of Wei- 
mar politics, which favored those contenders who worked in the subjunctive mood 
of the imagination. Paul has little patience with contemporary critics like Bertolt 
Brecht who dismissed Nazi propaganda as pure illusion. "A whitewash satisfied 
important needs," Paul counters; images referred to "mythic and utopian symbols" 
and mobilized emotions against "the arid language of democracy and rational dis- 
course" (p. 13). Although Paul occasionally describes this mobilization of pictures 
as "counterrevolutionary," he is more intent on uncovering the full register of poli- 
tics. As Carl Schorske argued long ago, mass politics had increasingly become an 
aesthetic form, a modernist genre.22 
A few characteristic figures constituted the main elements of visual propaganda. 
Large-format curbside posters depicting able-bodied workers, frontline soldiers, 
overfed bureaucrats, and subhuman Bolsheviks, as well as the visual and acoustic 
spectacle of uniformed ranks of National Socialist marchers, created an "illusion- 
ary world of existential threats and eminent apocalypse, of a radical transformation 
and a brown future" (p. 213). More than anything else, such visuals conveyed a 
sense of the movement's militance and determination. Although Harsch points to 
the pathetic, groaning proletarians in Social Democratic posters before Carlo Mier- 
endorff and Sergei Chakotin developed a more confident style, Paul sees little dif- 
ference between the muscular giants in standard left-wing and right-wing propa- 
ganda.23 With their unshakable convictions and vigilant poses, these oversized 
fantasy figures entered the public sphere to protect and destroy, not to debate and 
discuss. In them, the Nazis found an appealing revolutionary subject, confirming 
the streetwise abilities of Hitler's campaigners and signaling the social-reformist 
intentions of his regime. In the end, what the Nazis did was to steal from the Left, 
taking the "red of their flags and posters" as well as their "slogans, catchwords, 
and allegories" (p. 257)-inserting them into new contexts, to be sure, but also 
projecting a diffuse socialist future beyond Weimar which many workers evidently 
found appealing. 
22 Carl E. Schorske, "Politics in a New Key: An Austrian Triptych," in Fin-de-Si2cle Vienna: 
Politics and Culture (New York, 1980). 
2' Harsch, pp. 177-78. 
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Paul is keenly aware of the limits of aesthetic mobilization. Particularly before 
1933, the carefully choreographed compositions he describes were marred by 
counterdemonstrations, street battles, and unruly or drunken party members. And 
by autumn 1932, even Nazi sympathizers had become dulled to the party's visual 
effects. Moreover, there were as many constituents who did not need Goebbels's 
flim-flam to persuade them to vote for the Nazis as there were organized workers 
and rural Catholics who dismissed the hoopla altogether. And yet Paul has accom- 
plished a great deal. He outlines Nazi assessments of the crucial role that propa- 
ganda played in mobilizing homefront publics in World War I and class allegiances 
in 1918 and, furthermore, considers these assumptions quite plausible: he demon- 
strates how twentieth-century images spoke effectively to utopian yearnings for a 
more prosperous future and a greater sense of national belonging. At the same 
time, Paul notes the entirely subordinate role of political discourse and published 
tracts. In urban areas, electoral battles were fought primarily by posters and 
speeches. Goebbels referred again and again to the "Plakatkrieg" which the Left 
had won in the early 1920s but from which the Nazis would eventually emerge 
victorious. By contrast, the written word, which one leading Nazi named the "step- 
child of the movement" (p. 180), was associated with interest-group entitlements 
and parliamentary politics. Gerhard Paul presents an extremely rich argument indi- 
cating that the "social language of politics" might not have been as important as 
the emotional vocabulary of collective desire.24 
Paul does not attempt a reception analysis of Nazi visuals, but the gritty proletar- 
ian politics that Alf Liidtke explores confirm how effectively symbolic gestures 
and national tableaux enrolled workers in National Socialism. In a series of im- 
portant essays that have appeared over the last ten years, Ludtke undertakes nothing 
less than a reconceptualization of the political universe of the German working 
class. He wants not only to expand the emotional register of politics in ways en- 
tirely compatible with the work of Donna Harsch and Gerhard Paul but also to 
enlarge the terrain of politics so that the Grosse Politik of national affairs may be 
understood also in terms of the Kleinpolitik of shop-floor relations, tenancy fights, 
subsistence struggles, and, Ludtke might want to add, gender roles. People do not 
enter grand politics as autonomous individuals making rational choices, nor are 
they simply manipulated objects; rather, they participate in a variety of contests in 
which their engagement with authority might take the form of withdrawal, stealthy 
subversion, direct engagement, or even loud agreement. He introduces the term 
"Eigensinn," a kind of freedom staked out in these cautious and occasionally 
prickly relations to power, to understand the readiness of workers to support the 
war effort in 1914, their broad acceptance of National Socialism some twenty years 
later, and also their revolts, boycotts, and all-around stubbornness in the years 
19 18-20. 
The public sphere is not necessarily a place Ludtke's workers enter willingly. 
The desire to be among one's own kind, with workmates, family, and friends, often 
superseded allegiances to formal organizations and frequently reflected difficulties 
in dealing with state officials and welfare bureaucrats or in finding a stable liveli- 
24 Childers, "The Social Language of Politics" (n. 8 above). 
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hood or even in procuring bread. The fact is that the "attention and energy of male 
and female workers and housewives was still very much absorbed by the daily 
strain of survival" (p. 296). As Liidtke works it back into the stream of day-to-day 
life, politics remains central to workers, but the "party line," the regime, and other 
civic virtues are often peripheral. At the same time, reserve toward the powerful 
could easily give way to trust. Ludtke wonders what effect the Nazi slogan "Bread 
and Work" had on those adults who in winter 1932 once again tasted the bitter 
rations of 1916 and 1923 and surely hoped for a social order that would finally 
banish such misery (pp. 232-33). To consider workers' acceptance of the Nazi 
regime in light of the trauma of the wartime "Steckriibenwinter" (pp. 263,296) is 
the bold move of Ludtke's Alltagsgeschichte in which the clear lines between inter- 
est, ideology, and politics give way to unstable, tenuous, and mediated actions that 
are much more faithful to the complexity of people's lives.25 
Harsh economics are not everything, however. Drawing on the work of Bar- 
rington Moore, Liidtke insists that workers operate in public with a robust sense 
of honor.2b This can express itself in rebellious actions in the name of social justice, 
as in the November Revolution, but also in an entirely personal sense of achieve- 
ment grounded in supporting a family, spending a little extra on weekends, and 
advancing from one skill grade to another. Although Ludtke's arguments would 
have been enhanced had he disentangled male honor from working-class honor, he 
persuasively shows how easily Grosse Politik could draw legitimacy from Eigen- 
sinn. Iconic representations of muscle and sweat honored the labor of the worker 
and recognized his mastery of material and machine. In both World War I and 
World War 11, such a "Bilder-Sprache" (p. 334) composed powerful images of 
"German Quality Work" from countless discerning and proficient hands on the 
shop floor. These images at once esteemed labor and enrolled laborers into the 
"wholen-into the nation and the Volk. And "Nationale Arbeit" was not idle pro- 
paganda; already circulated by Social Democrats in the 1910s, patriotic images of 
labor allowed workers to reconcile vocational with collective identities and to con- 
nect quality on the workbench to prosperity around the comer, and they facilitated 
working-class acceptance of the National Sociali~ts.~' 
For all the book's rich insight, its usefulness is somewhat limited by its tentative 
nature. Although the subtitle promises "Ergebnisse"-research results-the vol-
ume is a collection of essays, most of which are argumentative rather than empiri- 
cal, intriguing rather than persuasive. Yet the great promise of Ludtke's forcefully 
argued agenda is to take seriously previously "scare-quoted concepts such as 
"Elzre," "Gemeinschaft," "Volk." and "Nation." Conceptions of what it meant to 
labor on the shop floor, to support a family in hard times, and to be a German, 
fears of winter rationing and hopes for a better life-all were politically complicit 
' 5  See also Geoff Eley, "Labor History, Social History, Alltagsgeschichte: Experience, Culture, 
and the Politics of the Everyday-A New Direction in German Social History?Vountal of Mod- 
ern Histop 61 (1989): 297-343. 
26 Banington Moore, Irzjustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt (New York. 1978). 
:'See Ludtke, pp. 307-9,328-29, 334-35. 
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dramatizations that could be mobilized in the public sphere. The thought- 
provoking conclusion that Liidtke reaches is that National Socialism was exten- 
sively "coproduced" (p. 332) by the cultural practices of everyday life. 
What recent studies of Weimar workers and National Socialists reveal are de- 
grees of affinity that have not been taken seriously until now. To be sure, the 
working-class appeal of the Nazis should not be overstated; after all, a majority of 
Social Democratic voters remained loyal to the party. Nonetheless, the historians 
under review here have provided compelling evidence that workers responded pos- 
itively to nationalist appeals. German workers repeatedly identified their own fate 
with that of the nation and in some cases used nationalism to reenchant radicalism. 
At issue is not the dutiful patriotism of "yellow" unions or small-town apprentices, 
but an imaginative rendering of the commonwealth that contained a compelling if 
unsystematic critique of German society and politics. In other words, there is no 
correspondence between social reform and republican politics. Weimar is not sim- 
ply the story of the Republic, and the demise of the moderate and republican parties 
should not be regarded as symptomatic of electoral panic and dislocation. In the 
minds of millions of voters, the Nazis figured as a movement that promised to 
introduce radical reforms benefiting all non-Jewish Germans. As a result, National 
Socialism was not a political choice that necessarily revoked the progressive social 
and economic aspirations that workers had long cherished. Moreover, the Nazis' 
success demonstrates the extent to which modem politics is not simply a matter of 
interest but also one of imagination. The study of the Weimar years continues to 
develop the post-Manrist proposition that interests need myths to speak for them- 
selves. What historians are left with is not one single Weimar story, but multiple 
versions in which the constitutive role of the nation and the community encouraged 
political mobilization along various fronts. 
If preoccupation with the fate of the Republic fails to catch the broad mobiliza- 
tion of interest and sentiment in the postwar years, it also neglects the exuberant 
confidence in design that "middling modernists" in the state administration shared 
with high-minded intellectuals in the avant-garde. In light of the ambitious at- 
tempts to renovate the social body, to improve national health, and to modernize 
the German economy, Weimar is less a cumulative failure than a series of bold 
experiments that do not come to an end with the year 1933.The ceaseless improve- 
ment of national capacities was all the more essential, since twentieth-century cir- 
cumstances of total war, imperial rivalry, and commercial competition appeared to 
underscore how endangered Germany had become. A shelf of recent books has 
attempted to take the measure of this imagination of design. Here too the stress 
is on the open-ended nature of mobilization, on the supererogatory, ideologically 
complicit assumptions that worked and reworked the Volkskiirpel: 
DESIGNINGTHE NATION 
Already in use during the Weimar years, the ominously authoritarian term Volks-
korper has been recirculated by present-day historians to draw attention to the ways 
in which the ambitious practices of newly professionalized groups such as engi- 
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neers and doctors meshed with the growing responsibilities of the state to renovate 
the nation for collective ends. It is particularly useful because it keeps in focus two 
fundamental twentieth-century developments: an open-ended one in the form of 
innovation made possible by the application of science and technology, and a de- 
limiting one in the form of increasing absorption with the fate of the nation. The 
crucial question in German history is to account for the enclosure of the modernist 
spirit of experimentation by the national collective at the expense of the individual 
and the particular. Two central texts by Detlev Peukert have become indispensable 
to this inquiry: The Weimar Republic: The Crisis of Classical Modernity, and the 
collection of essays entitled Max Webers Diagnose der M ~ d e r n e . ~ ~  It is worth re- 
viewing Peukert's contribution before assessing the most recent literature on the 
design of the nation. 
Peukert's untimely death in 1990left us with an exceptionally rich but basically 
incomplete analysis of modernity. His most coherent statements can be found in 
his synthetic history of the Weimar Republic, and yet these were superseded by 
darker suspicions expressed in his untranslated essays on Weber. Peukert refers to 
the Weimar years as "a crisis of the classical modern." The emancipatory potential, 
democratic practice, social reformism, and economic and technological rational- 
ization that Peukert identifies with modernization came all at once, in compressed 
and intense form, in the first three decades of the twentieth century. Moreover, 
these were accompanied, after 1929,by a severe economic downturn. This fateful 
coincidence Peukert compares to a "worst-case" scenario of the failure of a com- 
plex system (he makes an explicit reference to Chernobyl). Economic stagnation 
and cultural and political crisis led to an increasingly authoritarian, exclusive, and 
discriminatory state fully realized in National Socialism. In this line of argument, 
twentieth-century Germany is different not because it is burdened by a specific 
national past-the Sondenveg interpretation-but because it is simply an ex- 
treme case. 
What was innovative about Peukert's approach was his attention to the serious 
problems of and misgivings about modernization. In his view, the supposedly pro- 
gressive social-welfare complex, for example, rested on normative hierarchies of 
human worth that would be fully articulated by more repressive regimes. At the 
same time, Peukert acknowledged ways in which an allegedly antimodern "politics 
of cultural despair" constituted insightful responses to the incompleteness of mod- 
ern ra t ional i~m.~~ Because the pressures of modernist experimentation were in- 
tensely contradictory, its variations were politically diverse and included the com- 
forts of nostalgia as well as the temptations of totalitarianism. Moreover, Peukert's 
work deliberately placed Germany in a Western context and distinguished the most 
ominous catastrophes of the modem era from modernity itself. 
But Peukert permits others readings. In his brilliant essays on Max Weber, for 
example, he repeatedly invokes the "Janus face" of modernity and draws attention 
to the disenchantment and disorientation that have invariably accompanied indus- 
28 Detlev Peukert, Max Webers Diagnose der Modeme (Gottingen, 1989), and The Weimar Re- 
public (n.6 above). 
29 Peukert, The Weimar Republic, p. 188. 
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trial de~elopment .~~ Here Peukert does something he generally avoids in his history 
of the Weimar Republic: he plays with the equation of modernity and crisis, a 
plotline in which Germany becomes the archetypical expression of the very es- 
sence of modernity rather than a more isolated example of its most serious troubles. 
In this case, upheaval is the prevailing experience of the modem. And it is not 
only individuals who feel themselves freed from convention or marginalized by 
industrial development; professional elites, political institutions, and the state itself 
respond to the modem condition. These actors acknowledge the precarious nature 
of social structure but also recognize the far-reaching ability to reform and reno- 
ate.^' Renovation and experimentation are distinctive modernist practices, but be- 
cause they presume both the extreme malleability and the impermanence of the 
material world and are also often undertaken in conditions of apprehension, they 
can serve dangerously adventurous ends. This darker vision of modernism is com- 
pelling but not wholly persuasive. It is questionable, for example, whether the 
"spirit of science" introduces quite so automatically a "discourse of segregation" 
without the application of racist Doesn't politics choose its own science 
at least as much as science prefigures political regimes? And while the dangerous 
embrace of crisis and renovation makes intuitive sense, it cannot, by itself, explain 
the dynamic of modernist movements, which do not simply emerge out of a "dia- 
lectic of Enlightenment" but are deeply implicated in the particular experiences of 
total war and economic exhaustion. 
Shifting between a close examination of the crisis of Weimar and broader medi- 
tations on catastrophe, Peukert's work raises questions about the very nature of 
modernity: to what extent are reformist practices invariably collusions in disciplin- 
ary regimes, and to what extent do they turn ominous only in the extreme condi- 
tions that war, military defeat, and economic devastation produce? Peukert also 
suggests an alternate approach to the history of the Weimar Republic, which he 
views as a well-developed regime that articulated various strategies to organize 
social life. This functionalist reading of the modern state puts the accent on admin- 
istrative innovation rather than political collapse. Unfortunately, the volume of es- 
says prepared as a memorial to Peukert, Zivilisation und Barbarei: Die wider- 
spriichliche Potentiale der Modeme, is disappointing. There is little sustained 
engagement with Peukert's work and insufficient reflection by the authors on what 
modernity might be. Therefore, the alleged contradictions of the modern are often 
confused with unpleasant events. One exception is Geoff Eley's opening chapter, 
30 See, in particular, "Die 'letzten Menschen': Beobachtungen zur Kulturkritik im Geschichts- 
bild Max Webers," originally published in Geschichte und Gesellschaji 12 (1986): 425-42, and 
"Der Janusgesicht der Modeme," both now in Max Webers Diagnose. 
3' See Modris Eksteins, The Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modem Age 
(Boston, 1989); Peter Fritzsche, "Landscape of Danger, Landscape of Design: Crisis and Modern- 
ism in Weimar Germany," in Dancing on the Volcano: Essays on the Culture of the Weimar Repub- 
lic, ed. Thomas W. Kniesche and StephenBrockrnann (Columbia, S.C., 1994), pp. 29-46; and Paul 
Rabinow, French Modem: Norms and Forms of the Social Environment (Cambridge, Mass., 1989). 
32 Detlev J. K. Peukert, "The Genesis of the 'Final Solution' from the Spirit of Science," in 
Reevaluating the Third Reich, ed. Thomas Childers and Jane Caplan (New York, 1993). pp. 234- 
52, here p. 249. 
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which locates the development of the disciplinary practices that fashion the Volks-
korper in the late nineteenth-century rise of administrative sciences such as psy- 
chology and psychiatry and in "the priority of the social" in popular nationalism 
(p. 29). Not a deficit of modernity but the very modem "scientific and technocratic 
ambitions" of social policy prepared the ground for National Socialism (p. 54). 
Richard Bessel, in contrast, seems rather uninspired by Peukert and sanguinely 
identifies benign modernism on one side of World War I and deleterious disorder 
on the other. Yet it is disorder that legitimized all the more completely the introduc- 
tion of disciplinary renovation, although scholars debate whether repressive norm- 
ative regimes are the function of long-term rationalization, as the excellent essay 
by Adelheid von Saldern implies, or of economic emergency, as the more narrowly 
focused chapter on the economic emergency by Uwe Lohalm indicates.33 
Recent work on Weimar social policy has tended to take a middle road, unwill- 
ing to reduce social policy to social discipline without taking the political motiva- 
tions of practitioners into account but mindful as well of the normative standards 
that invariably accompany the organization of social life. Historians do agree that 
the focus of almost all social reform was on the nation-state. From the national 
efficiency campaigns of the 1890s to the elaboration of social welfare and mater- 
nity policies in the 1920s to the alarming civil defense exercises of the 1940s, 
citizens were assessed, categorized, mobilized, treated, and improved insofar as 
they were potentially productive members of the nation. Given the intense interna- 
tional competition for imperial spoils and commercial advantage, and the increas- 
ingly technical challenges of daily life, the period 1870-1945 stands out; at no 
time before or since have administrative practices targeted Europeans in terms of 
their respective nationalities so relentlessly, with so much foreboding, and with 
such abandon. 
The Volkskiirper is at the center of Cornelie Usborne's engaging and welcome 
analysis, The Politics of the Body in Weimar Germany. Usborne is well aware of 
the fact that women's bodies have played key roles in efforts to protect the body 
politic from social diseases since the nineteenth century. In the last years before 
World War I, especially, discussions about the condition of the nation were medi- 
calized as doctors identified demographic crises and eugenic debilities and, in turn, 
recommended appropriate therapies. But it was the war itself that led to the dra- 
matic shift from an undifferentiated neo-Malthusian stimulation of the birthrate in 
Wilhelmine Germany to obsessive eugenic concern with the quality of the popula- 
tion in the Weimar Republic. Ever more total mobilization revealed the stakes not 
merely in creating more but in fashioning better Germans. Unfortunately, Usborne 
does not examine biomedical discourse during the war, which would have revealed 
the rapid expansion of interventionist techniques to construct the national body. 
33 Geoff Eley, "Die deutsche Geschichte und die wdersp~che der Moderne: Das Beispiel des 
Kaiserreiches," pp. 17-65; Richard Bessel, "Die Krise der Weimarer Republik als Erblast des 
verlorenen Krieges," pp. 98-1 14;Adelheid von Saldem, "'Statt Kathedralen die Wohnmaschine': 
Paradoxien der Rationalisierung im Kontext der Moderne:' pp. 168-92; and Uwe Lohalm, "Die 
Wohlfahrtskrise, 1930-1933: Vom okonomischen Notprogramm zw rassenhygienischen Neube- 
stimmung," pp. 193-225, all in Bajohr et al., eds. 
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The inattention to the war and the exclusive focus on the postwar years casts Us- 
borne's therapists in a decidedly defensive light as they deal with postwar short- 
ages, veterans, and refugees. Yet it was the war that best demonstrated the ways in 
which a functional Volkskorpercould be created, made urgent the state's duty to 
do so, and generated a consensus from Left to Right that individual bodies were 
subordinate to the national collective. Total war did not simply pose organizational 
challenges but generated imaginative possibilities to reinvent the nation as 
In a clear and persuasive exposition, Usborne examines the ways in which Wei- 
mar women were the targets of intervention in four different areas: maternity, sexu- 
ality, contraception, and abortion. She finds considerable agreement among social- 
ists, liberals, and right-wing moralists that the state had a responsibility to preserve 
national health by fortifying an ideology of motherhood, regulating sexuality, and 
otherwise encouraging eugenic behavior. Even as the lives of women improved 
with the extension of social-welfare services, maternity benefits, and the ready 
availability of contraception (a single Berlin manufacturer sold twenty-four million 
condoms in 1928, mostly for the home market), these measures contained a pre- 
scriptive aspect. They cast women in a "domestic rather than a public role" for the 
sake of the collective good (p. 210). Only a few women doctors argued that women 
had the right to control their bodies as individuals. However, Usborne is careful 
not to demonize the politics of the body and usefully compares Weimar debates to 
the much less informed discussion in England. She recognizes the commitment of 
the republican government to improve the lives of mothers and commends the 
churches for their open attitudes in sexual matters. But in the end, Usborne empha- 
sizes the creation of a biological imagination in which the individual body was 
made to conform more and more completely to the demands of the Volkskorpel:It 
is on the basis of this qualitative reconstruction of the national body that a funda- 
mental continuity between Weimar and Nazi Germany can be identified. While 
Nazi practice was infinitely more coercive, segregation of "defectives" and steril- 
ization of the "unfit" received official sanction well before 1933. This well- 
conceived and unpretentious book is the first to map out the politics of the body 
for this period and stands as a major contribution to German history. 
The welfare state has as much to do with the conduct of warfare and the rational- 
ization of the workforce as it does with material gains to benefit disadvantaged 
citizens. Today, its history is no longer written simply in terms of the political 
balance between left-wing reformers and the opposing right-wing employers. As 
Usborne demonstrates, welfare was a crucial administrative site for fitting people 
into various public and private roles regarded as crucial for the healthy develop- 
ment of the nation. The politics of the body did not follow conventional differences 
between Left and Right, for even when political enemies disagreed about morality 
or capitalism they shared basic assumptions about the collective ends of public 
policy. No less important than the protection of healthy married mothers was the 
34 See the pathbreaking arguments in Michael Geyer, "The Stigma of Violence, Nationalism, 
and War in 'hentieth-Century Germany," German Studies Review (Winter 1992), pp. 86-91; and 
also Paul Weindling, Health, Race and German Politics behveen National Un$cation and Nazism, 
1870-1945 (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 9,281-97. 
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creation of a disciplined labor force. In her fine analysis of adolescent youth, Eliza- 
beth Harvey explores the border separating the core of "regular (usually male) 
workers," who enjoyed full-time employment and benefits, and the periphery of 
"those workers, often young andlor female, who were employed casually" (p. 6). 
Both Social Democrats and their bourgeois opponents deployed techniques of su- 
pervision and even coercion to impose healthy and productive forms of behavior. 
These normative practices were not always objectionable and included individual- 
ized counseling, vocational schooling, and job training as well as the usual admon- 
ishments against hedonism and consumption, but they all rested on the assumption 
that what they considered to be disorderly lives should be ordered. With the coming 
of the Great Depression, welfare authorities hit "the limits of social discipline," 
drastically delimited the pedagogical sphere, and reclassified more and more in- 
tractable youths as uneducable. Incarceration rates soared; efforts at reform and 
rehabilitation dwindled.35 However, economic stringency did not create hierarchies 
of human worth; it simply gave them increasingly dangerous implications as the 
state turned from discipline to triage. 
Both Usborne and Harvey follow Peukert to emphasize the role of the Depres- 
sion in giving momentum to eugenic propositions about who was worth investing 
in and who was not. Budget cuts reduced or eliminated welfare programs after 
1930; and three years later the Nazi seizure of power resulted in the purge of thou- 
sands of socialist and Jewish welfare officials. Political revolution thus enforced 
the tendency of financial constraints: the raucous debates that had shaped Weimar 
social policy came to a quick end. The sad result was legislation based exclusively 
on the principles of negative eugenics. The period 1930-33 is thus a crucial water- 
shed. Nonetheless, the longer-term continuities between Weimar and Nazi Ger- 
many cannot be ignored. Beginning in World War I, the social body was widely 
recognized as a national concern that justified administrative intervention as the 
state attempted to standardize the role of women, discipline young adults, and con- 
sider the segregation of allegedly "worthless" human material. (Euthanasia in the 
late 1930s was often justified by pointing to the high death rates in German asy- 
lums and old-age homes that were the result of food shortages and professional 
neglect during World War I.) Whether to ameliorate the lives of the underprivi- 
leged, to meet the challenges of an increasingly rationalized capitalist marketplace, 
or to prepare for war, Menschenokonornie regulated the way state authorities ap- 
proached citizens, who were regarded in increasingly productivist and functional 
terms. In these analyses, social policy had the effect of creating a national subject 
of production. 
The most basic continuity between Weimar and Nazi policy lies in the assump- 
tion that human material could and should be remolded. It is the idea of mobiliza- 
tion rather than the particular aims of mobilization that constitutes the common 
ground between the two regimes. Weimar reformers and Nazi eugenicists shared a 
genuine optimism about the possibility of renovating society, although this opti- 
mism was tempered by the acknowledgment of the pervasive instability of human 
"See also Detlev J .  K. Peukert, Grenren der Sorialdisziplinierung: Aufstieg und Krise der 
deutschen Jugendfursorge, 1878 bis 1932 (Cologne, 1986). 
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relations. Therefore, both were obsessed with "shiftless, unskilled boy laborers and 
sexualized girls" as well as asocial adult~~~--the frail margins of a social body that 
required vigilant social policing. Indeed, the more serious the emergency, the more 
legitimate social reform was considered to be. Characteristic Weimar images of the 
crippled veteran, the unemployment line, the destitute middle-class creditor, the 
tumbledown metropolitan facade all provided stark testimony to the impermanence 
of the material world but also to the tractability of its reconstruction. History had 
never appeared so dangerous or so open-ended as when it was viewed from the 
midst of the ruins of the postwar years. 
Just how much Weimar was appreciated by contemporaries as an ongoing exper- 
iment in social renovation becomes evident in the restless self-criticism implicit in 
their appraisals of the United States, which is the subject of Mary Nolan's illumi- 
nating new study, Visions of Modernity: American Business and the Modernization 
of Germany. Before World War I, America was not particularly relevant to Ger- 
mans, who had few major doubts about their own itinerary of national develop- 
ment. Once the Wilhelmine future was challenged by the upheaval of war and the 
humiliation of defeat, however, the very newness of America offered Germans 
ways out of the binds of failed history. America indicated the magnitude of the 
possibility of renovation and the open-endedness of future development. For this 
reason the "imaginative vision of Germany's future was shaped . . . by the percep- 
tion of America's present" (p. 5) in ways that were not as pertinent to the victorious 
powers, Great Britain and France. America fascinated Germany not simply be- 
cause it offered potential versions of modernity but also because America's exuber- 
ant liberation from tradition corresponded most closely to Germany's calamities in 
the 1920s. After the war it appeared that Germany had little choice but to reimagine 
itself in the future tense. 
The task of reinventing the nation was undertaken with enthusiasm. By the mid- 
1920s, trade unionists, liberal economists, engineers, and business leaders all had 
a great deal to say about the German future they saw prefigured in America. Of 
course, there was no consensus about the America that shaped these German vi- 
sions, and Nolan expertly distinguishes the views of labor leaders, who saw an 
efficient economy geared toward mass consumption, from the antiunion outlook 
of business, which stressed the free hand of factory owners and the diligence of 
factory hands, from the visions of engineers, who admired the scale and efficiency 
of production. German ideology consistently reshuffled the American experience 
to emphasize, in turn, consumption, discipline, and technology. And yet the itiner- 
aries of German visitors to the United States were very much the same. The 
America they saw was urban, industrial, and midwestern. Indigenous burdens of 
history and poverty that were plain to see in the South would have obscured the 
triumph over history that the massive humanwork of Chicago and Detroit-and, 
most of all, Henry Ford's factories-seemed to reveal. Technology rather than na- 
ture, monumental movement rather than pristine inactivity, attracted the German 
eye. Right or Left, the emphasis was on the techniques of mobility. 
Nolan concludes that the German obsession with Fordism and the great promise 
36 Harvey, p. 297. 
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of rationalization ended with the Great Depression. Thereafter, "Americanism did 
not provide an appealing model of modernity," she writes, "and utopian aspirations 
could no longer be expressed in the language of rationalization" (p. 232). Politics, 
Nolan adds, rather than economics or technology, seemed to provide solutions to 
Germany's pressing problems. That the National Socialists rejected merely techno- 
cratic and managerial approaches and emphasized the priority of explicitly ideo- 
logical and racial strategies is beyond dispute. And yet the primacy of politics 
rested on the assumption that society could be mobilized and transformed. For the 
Nazis as much as for Weimar reformers, the global crises since the outbreak of the 
war had invalidated past history and revealed a vast arena for improvisation. Wei- 
mar's political sciences-geopolitics, the myth of the friend and the foe-its social 
sciences-welfare legislation, maternity programs, eugenics-and its intellectual 
cultures-radical nationalism, Bauhaus, Neue Sachlichkeit-rewrote the material 
world in increasingly plastic terms. The fiscal frustrations of the late 1920s only 
heightened the urgency of improvisation, as had the emergency of war and defeat 
in the 1910s. This Baulehre-or what Peukert has termed "Machbarkeitswahn," a 
heady sense of the possible-was characteristic of Weimar reformers on the Right 
and on the Left.37 For city planners, welfare experts, business-minded rationalists, 
and extreme nationalists, engineering of one sort or another served as the basis for 
the mobilization and transformation of the Volkskorpel: The common note in the 
explorations undertaken by Usborne, Harvey, and Nolan is the centrality of design 
in the political imagination of the Weimar Republic. 
Improvisation is also the keynote of the beautifully compiled sourcebook edited 
by Anton Kaes, Martin Jay, and Edward Dimendberg. Thirty chapters arrange 327 
documents on Weimar themes as diverse as sexuality, consumption, radio, Jewish 
life, right-wing nationalism, inflation, and prisons. And while certain omissions 
might be noted, such as the absence of thematic complexes that treat questions of 
representation, or of tradition, shock, or novelty, the editors have rightly placed the 
emphasis on experimentation. As a "laboratory for modernity" (p. xvii), the Wei- 
mar experience appears as a "frantic kaleidoscopic shuffling of the fragments of a 
nascent modernity and the remnants of a persistent past" (p. xviii). The generally 
punchy style of the manifestos, vignettes, and declarations reflects the impress of 
formidable forces that have acted thoroughly (defeats are utter, strikes general, 
struggles great), with great power (industry is concentrated, culture monotone, the 
masses overwhelming), and with tremendous speed and surprise (people are left 
alone and panicked, things are tom and tattered). In the face of so much novelty, 
witnesses feel variously disoriented and abandoned, endangered and delighted. 
Only a few commentators such as Kurt Tucholsky debunk these postwar preten- 
sions to the end of history and cynically expose the immobility of so much German 
culture. There is also little writing that seeks to safeguard or restore or commemo- 
rate, and these documents come mostly from the political center. The texts assem- 
bled here are not lachrymose or nostalgic. For the most part, a sense of exuberant 
possibility enchants the landscape they describe. Artists, technicians, politicians, 
37 Peukert, Max Webers Diagnose, pp. 69, 110-11. See also Fritzsche, "Landscape of Danger, 
Landscape of Design," pp. 29-46. 
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scientists, and athletes, among many, many others in this collection, cast them- 
selves as searchers, adventurers, muckrakers, and pioneers. Of course, the juxtapo- 
sitions and collages that the discontinuity of postwar experience created are pre- 
cisely the things that make Weimar so aesthetically interesting, and postmodern 
intellectual fashions of the present day have shaped the selection of texts, as the 
editors freely admit. In this regard, the texts are a little too canonical: Weimar 
perennials like Walter Benjamin and Kurt Tucholsky appear five times each; Emst 
Jiinger and Carl von Ossietsky three times. Also unfortunate for a "sourcebook" is 
the reliance on so many essays rather than on blueprints, court cases, directives, 
and manuals. The sources are mostly opinions that imagine but do not enforce 
power, and fully 12 percent of the texts come from two left-wing journals, Welt-
buhne and Das Tagebuch. Nonetheless, this volume is a splendid archaeology of 
modernism. It reveals a great deal about how history was viewed during the Wei- 
mar years and how those promiscuous viewings armed the political imagination in 
dangerous ways. 
Examining Weimar remains an intellectual preoccupation at the end of the twen- 
tieth century because Weimar provides such a compelling version of history. As is 
evident from the most recent historical studies, modem Germany is a place where 
the imaginative foundations of politics appear particularly manifest. One dramatic 
illustration of the assumption that social life could be designed is the array of ad- 
ministrative practices presupposed by the notion of the Volkskiirper:The fascina- 
tion with experimentation pervaded intellectual and cultural life as well, as The 
Weimar Republic Sourcebook makes clear. That the historical process was widely 
regarded as inherently unstable in twentieth-century Germany is not surprising. By 
the end of the nineteenth century, Germany seemed the quintessential product of 
manufacture: railroads, factories, retail goods, and sprawling cities had literally 
created a second nature more extensive and more complete than elsewhere in Eu- 
rope. War, revolution, and economic collapse appeared to confirm the imperma- 
nence of the material world. Of course, Britain and France endured substantial 
social and economic upheavals as well. But Weimar's political and intellectual cul- 
ture was distinctive for the exclusiveness of its identification with the circum- 
stances of contingency. And it is this identification that makes the 1920s so recog- 
nizably modem. 
On the one hand, postwar Germans had the sense of living among ruins, a nostal- 
gic state of mind that nourished reactionary politics of the sort that Bessel explores, 
though one that also exhibited an aesthetic fascination with fragments, margins, 
and the temporariness of life which, in the hands of Walter Benjamin, for example, 
punctured the claims of master narratives and commonsense realism.38 On the 
other hand, Germans from all political camps recognized the possibility that col- 
lapsing structures might be steadied, at least for a time. Emergency conditions 
offered opportunities for amelioration. As mobilization during World War I sug-
gested, healthier citizens could be fashioned, more productive workers trained, and 
unworthy delinquents sorted out. Later in the 1920s, Carl Schmitt elaborated new 
38 David Frisby, Fragments of Modernify: Theories of Modernify in the Work of Simmel, Kra- 
cauer and Benjamin (Cambridge. Mass.. 1986). 
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collective myths to forge national consensus, a thoroughly modernist gesture since 
he acknowledged the exhaustion of traditional belief structures even as he tried to 
banish the moral relativism that had replaced them with the purely arbitrary dis- 
tinction between friend and foe.39 Schmitt's constructive myth building was a con- 
scious disavowal of nostalgia's essential passivity. From this perspective, it ap- 
peared that contingency could be managed to the national advantage; the very 
marauding movements of history promised to reanimate its multiple possibilities. 
What still needs to be explained, however, is why the management of contingency 
so often took the form of fierce nationalist revivals. Few intellectuals echoed Hel- 
muth Plessner, the Weimar sociologist who embraced the "anonymity, itinerancy, 
[and] dispersion" of modern life because it opened up a new "horizon of possibil- 
it^."^^ Striking a remarkably postmodern pose, Plessner celebrated the multiple 
self-stylizations of the self. But his contemporaries proved unwilling to embark on 
this stimulating voyage. Again and again, in the face of the collapse of history, 
critics as diverse as Schmitt, Ernst Bloch, and Georg Lukics attempted to retrieve 
community in totalist collectivities such as class, nation, and Volk. These drarnati- 
zations, in turn, generated "narratives of empowerment" that enrolled individuals 
in compelling ways.41 Weimar was the postwar workshop in which these more or 
less fierce versions of the future were constructed. That democracy failed or that 
Plessner remained alone in his search did not diminish the operations of this place. 
The coming of the Third Reich in 1933 was not so much verification of Weimar's 
singular failure as the validation of its dangerous potential. 
39 Wolfgang Essbach, "Radikalismus und Modemitzet bei Jiinger und Bloch, Lukks und 
Schmitt," pp. 145-59; and Manfred Gangl, "Mythos der Gewalt und Gewalt des Mythos: Georges 
Sorels Einfluss auf rechte und linke Intellektuelle der Weimarer Republik," pp. 171-95, both in 
the excellent collection edited by Manfred Gangl and Gerard Raulet, Intellektuellendiskurse in der 
Weimarer Republik: Zurpolitischen Kultur einer Gemengelage (Frankfurt, 1994). See also Norbert 
Bolz, Auszug aus der entzauberten Welt: Philosophischer Extremismus zwischen den Weltkriegen 
(Munich, 1989). 
40 See Helmuth Plessner, Grenzen der Gemeinschafr: Eine Kritik des sozialen Radikalismus 
(Bonn, 1924); Helmuth Lethen, Verhaltenslehren der Kalte: Lebensversuche zwischen den Kriegen 
(Frankfurt, 1994), pp. 8-9; and Michael Makropoulos, "Haltlose Souveranitat: Benjamin, Schmitt 
und die Klassische Modeme in Deutschland," in Gangl and Raulet, eds., pp. 197-211, who also 
discusses the management of contingency. 
'' Geyer, "The Stigma of Violence," p. 76. 
